Abstract-The perception of natural scenes relies on the integration of pre-existing knowledge with the immediate results of attentional processing, and what can be remembered from a scene depends in turn on how that scene is perceived and understood. However, there are conflicting results in the literature as to whether people are more likely to remember those objects that are consistent with the scene or those that are not. Moreover, whether any discrepancy between the likelihood of remembering schema-consistent or schema-inconsistent objects should be attributed to the schematic effects on attention or on memory remains unclear. To address this issue, the current study attempted to directly manipulate attention allocation by requiring participants to look at (i) schema-consistent objects, (ii) schema-inconsistent objects, or (iii) to share attention equally across both. Regardless of the differential allocation of attention or object fixation, schema-consistent objects were better recalled whereas recognition was independent of schema-consistency, but depended on task instruction. These results suggest that attention is important both for remembering low-level object properties, and information whose retrieval is not supported by the currently active schema. Specific knowledge of the scenes being viewed can result in the recall of non-fixated objects, but without such knowledge attention is required to encode sufficient detail for subsequent recognition. Our results demonstrate therefore that attention is not critical for the retrieval of objects that are consistent with a scene's schematic content.
INTRODUCTION
The apparent ease and efficiency with which we perceive and comprehend everyday real world scenes clearly belies an enormous computational problem undertaken by the visual system. Theoretical accounts of this problem usually involve a number of key elements that include the instantiation of memorial processes, the distribution of visual attention and the deployment of eye movements that combine to employ an efficient strategy to construct a putative internal representation of the scene being viewed (e.g. De Graef et al., 1990; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978) . A key aspect in the efficiency of scene perception, given the well documented limited bandwidth of attention is undoubtedly attention-memory interactions, as processes based on memorial resources can rapidly direct the allocation of visual attention to particular objects; and attention can 'filter' the information available to memorial processes.
What is remembered about a scene can often provide insight into the processes involved at the time of perception (e.g. Baddeley, 1999; Bartlett, 1932) . In a number of studies that have assessed performance on the recall and recognition of objects presented in a scene, a familiar pattern of results emerges: objects that are consistent with the context of a scene are usually well recalled but poorly recognised, whereas objects that are inconsistent with the context of a scene are usually well recognised but poorly recalled (e.g. Goodman, 1980) . This pattern of results has often been taken to suggest that visual attention is asymmetrically deployed with the result that schema-inconsistent objects receive more visual scrutiny and processing than their schema-consistent counterparts as an information-rich internal representation of the scene is developed (e.g. Brewer and Treyens, 1981; De Graef et al., 1990; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Palmer, 1975; Pezdek et al., 1989; Simons and Levin, 1997) .
In contrast to the interpretation of schematic effects based on visual attention, it has also been argued that an object's consistency with the schema that is currently in operation influences its memorability per se due to as yet unspecified underlying memorial processes (e.g. Alba and Hasher, 1983; Chapman and Groeger, in press) .
It is not possible, at present, to separate these two explanations. The purpose of the present paper therefore is to use eye-movement recordings and explicit viewing instructions to dissociate the role of attention and/or the corresponding visual scrutiny from the underlying effects of memory processes. The few studies that have included both eye-movement recording and effective measures of subsequent memory for real world scenes (e.g. Friedman, 1979) did not constrain the viewing strategy of their observers, so it is not possible to be sure that the memory results do not reflect biases in attention deployment at encoding. Moreover, although similar in most respects, most studies (e.g. Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Pezdek et al., 1989) differ in how recognition memory was measured (e.g. recognising names of objects that might have appeared rather than showing participants pictorial examples of objects that may have been present) and used few controls during the viewing epoch, so their outcomes cannot be compared directly to address the issue of interest here.
To address these problems, the present study recorded eye movements as participants viewed four different scenes, which depicted different salient 'everyday' actions. The stimuli used were based on the idea of an 'action schema', which is a memorial structure organised around a well-known action depicted by a salient actor in a scene (see Goodman, 1980 ). Goodman (1980) used cartoon-like representations which allowed her to control the information in her stimuli very precisely, whereas we used real-world photo realistic versions which, although preferable in terms of much greater general validity, by definition, were less controlled (see Fig. 1 ). Nevertheless, they were ideal for our experimental purposes as we have shown in pilot studies that they can create the pattern of recall and recognition results as reported by Goodman (see Silva et al., 2002) . In the present study, memory for the scene was subsequently assessed by using both verbal recall and visual recognition tests. By taking advantage of methods that have previously shown that orienting instructions exert a considerable influence on how scenes are inspected (e.g. Marks et al., 1992; Yarbus, 1967) we manipulated the allocation of attention to information in the scene that was consistent or inconsistent with the action depicted. Observers were allocated to one of three experimental groups based on whether they were required to name (a) objects that were relevant to the action portrayed in each scene (schemaconsistent objects), (b) objects that were not relevant to the action portrayed in each scene (schema-inconsistent objects), or (c) objects in the scene whose names began with the letter 'c'. An important aspect of the design was that participants were not forewarned that they would undergo a memory test, because instructions to remember the content of a scene may cause different viewing behaviour or may alter subsequent memory for that scene (see Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980) . This combination of monitoring of viewing, deliberate biasing of attention towards or away from schema related information, and testing both verbal recall and visual recognition, permitted the assessment of the role that previous knowledge plays in the search of and memory for real world scenes.
Note that the explicit deployment of visual attention is usually manifest by the pattern of eye movements, which can be recorded during perception (e.g. Muller and Rabbitt, 1980; Posner, 1980) and we adhere to this premise here.
METHOD

Observers
Thirty-six psychology students took part in the experiment, 29 of whom received a course credit for their participation. All participants reported normal or correctedto-normal vision.
Stimuli
Comprised digital colour (16-bit colour) scenes of a female performing one of four everyday actions including (i) cooking, (ii) ironing, (iii) reading and (iv) teamaking (see Fig. 1 ). The actor was dressed the same in each scene. Each scene also contained a range of situationally-plausible objects that varied in the degree to which they were associated with the action being performed (as determined in a pilot study; see Silva et al., 2002) . Four of these objects were selected as target objects: two were relevant to the action depicted (schema-consistent items) and two were not (schema-inconsistent items). All the target objects were similar in size and were distributed across scenes in their natural positions. In the recognition condition, targets and distractors were presented to the observer on either side of the centre of the screen against a white background.
Apparatus
The stimuli were presented on a 19 VGA colour monitor with a spatial resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels (31.3
• and 24.5 • ). Viewing distance was 25 in. Eye movements were recorded using a remote ASL Eyetracker Optics, controlled by a Model 5000 portable control unit.
Procedure
Observers were tested individually and were told that they would have to name as many objects in 'pictures of everyday scenes' as they could in 15 seconds. Participants were not told that their memory for these scenes would later be tested. Observers were allocated to one of three experimental groups based on whether they were expected to name aloud as they viewed each scene (i) objects that were relevant to the action portrayed in each scene, (ii) objects that were not relevant to the action portrayed in each scene, or (iii) objects in the scene whose names began with the letter 'c'. The scenes were viewed in succession after which (i) recall and (ii) recognition performance was assessed. In the recall condition, observers were cued using the label of the action depicted, and were required to name as many objects in 40 seconds as they could remember (whether or not they had named these earlier). In the recognition condition, observers were presented with two alternatives (target and distractor) and had to identify which had appeared in the scene.
RESULTS
Naming and eye movements
Results clearly confirm that observers complied with the naming instructions when required to name schema-consistent (98%) and schema-inconsistent (80%) objects. Some 5% of the items named by each group were neither schema-consistent nor schema-inconsistent according to our a priori classification.
Dwell time (see Note 1) per object and number of fixations (see Note 2) per object were calculated for each object in each scene by each observer. Four observers were eliminated from the analysis because of absence of meaningful scan paths (e.g. failure to maintain body position after calibration, etc.).
Overall, observers looked at schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects for a similar amount of time (F (1, 29) = 2.3; p > 0.1), but this effect depended on what observers had been instructed to name (F (2, 29) = 14.5, p < 0.001; see Fig. 2 ). Post hoc tests revealed that dwell times corresponded Figure 2 . Mean total dwell time in seconds on both object schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects for each of the three task instruction groups, collapsed across scenes. Error bars depict ± SE.
with the naming requirement. Schema-consistent objects were looked at for longer (t (8) = 5.7, p < 0.001) than schema-inconsistent objects (t (10) = −2.6, p < 0.05) and the anticipated equal sharing of dwell time between consistent and inconsistent objects when observers were required to name objects beginning with 'c' was borne out (t < 1). Results for analyses of number of fixations yielded similar results. Frequency of fixations was unaffected by naming-group or object-consistency (both F s < 1) but the number of fixations on schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects was heavily influenced by the naming instruction (F (2, 29) = 15.6, p < 0.001; see Fig. 3 ).
There were more fixations on schema-consistent objects when naming such objects (t (8) = 4.6, p < 0.005) and more fixations on schema-inconsistent objects when naming these (t (10) = −3.2, p < 0.01) and again, similar numbers of fixations between both schema-consistency object categories in the neutral condition (t < 1).
These results confirm that when asked to name objects of a specified type, explicit attention is deployed in order to facilitate performance. The critical issue for this study is whether the scene representations formed in the course of doing so are sufficient to support later remembering, particularly of objects inconsistent with the search strategy required by naming instructions. 
Memory
The data from the recall and recognition memory tests were analysed as follows. For recall, all objects mentioned were classified in terms of whether they were consistent with the theme of the schema, and whether they were indeed part of the original picture (see Note 3). In each case memory test order was entered into the model of analysis of variance used, but since it featured neither in statistically reliable main effects nor interactions (all F < 1), test order will not be considered further.
Across all conditions, a higher percentage of schema-consistent items were recalled (F (1, 33) = 175.2, p < 0.001) but the relative recall of schemaconsistent and schema-inconsistent objects was influenced by naming-instruction (F (2, 30) = 31.5, p < 0.001; see Fig. 4 ). Post hoc tests revealed that the advantage for recall of schema-consistent information was statistically reliable irrespective of what observers had been instructed to name, or what they subsequently looked at (p < 0.05 or lower). Post hoc tests also revealed that the incidence of recall of schema-consistent objects was greatest in the schema-consistent naming group, and recall of schema-inconsistent objects was reliably higher in the schema-inconsistent naming group. As mentioned above, the number of schema-consistent and schemainconsistent objects named was similar in the neutral condition, and thus people were not simply remembering what they had previously named. For recognition, the results contrasted markedly with those that emerged from the recall task. There was no overall advantage for recognition of schema-consistent information (F < 1) but a naming-instruction x schema-consistent interaction was again in evidence (F (2, 30) = 10.2, p < 0.001; see Fig. 5 ). Naming instructions dominated recognition memory. Post hoc tests showed that the naming instruction in the neutral condition resulted in equally accurate recognition of scheme-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects, but reliably greater recognition of schema-consistent objects or reliably greater recognition of schema-inconsistent objects (both p < 0.01), depending on which type of objects participants had been instructed to name.
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to address the relative importance of attention and memory in the creation of the well known asymmetry in the representation and memory of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent objects. This asymmetry emerges when observers are tested on recall and recognition performance following viewing everyday scenes, although the present study is unusual in that these effects are explored using images of naturalistic actions situated in real world scenes, rather than impoverished depictions of collections of objects. The results show that when asked to name objects presented in a scene according to a simple rule, observers' eye-movement patterns reflect their attempt to do so. The result of constraining viewing in this way is that some objects in a scene are better recalled, when they are typical elements of the action depicted in that scene. In contrast, recognising specific details about objects from those scenes is largely independent of the action depicted, but depends almost entirely on whether or not the object concerned was fixated/named. The fact that observers were unaware that their memory for the scenes they saw would later be assessed, it is reasonable to assume that the viewing behaviour we report is driven solely by the task of determining whether any object fixated upon is or is not related to the action depicted, and naming it as appropriate.
These results show, principally, that the recall performance of schema-consistent information is better irrespective of inspection patters whereas recognition performance was dependent to a great extent on the task instruction. This pattern of results conflicts with the results of previous studies of memory for real world scenes as described above (Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Pezdek et al., 1989) . Although these studies are very similar in procedural terms, only the Pezdek study assessed recognition by showing participants copies of objects they had seen earlier. As a result, the Brewer study could not determine whether participants retained specific visual details of the objects for which we found object fixation to be critical. The inconsistency of recall results between our study and those reported by Pezdek may be attributable to the extended time available for viewing the scene (1 minute against 15 seconds). The reduced time and requirement to name particular types of object would both have reduced the scope to more elaborate encoding and repeated viewing which might be expected to increase recall memory for information inconsistent with the scene.
We have assumed here that the process of scene perception involves the rapid creation of a putative representation of that scene (but see Rensink et al., 1997) through a combination of memory instantiation and attentional deployment (e.g. Biederman, 1981) . In trying to remember such scenes, this representation enables the generation or regeneration of objects that are plausible in terms of the scene's context and this generation, together with whatever residual direct experience remains, forms the basis of what is recognised and recalled. This study shows clearly that, unless a particular object is fixated during the course of this process, the accessible scene information in this representation is unlikely to be sufficiently detailed to determine which of two versions of an object had actually been present. However, attention is not critical for the retrieval of objects taht are consistent with a scene's schematic content. These objects can be recalled without having previously been attended to or fixated. In such circumstances it is the underlying memorial processes that seem to determine performance and not the generative inspection patterns based on them.
In summary, the process of scene perception and the development of representations about those scenes seem to rely on the combining of attentional patterns and the existing knowledge that is evoked at the time of perception.
